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Philosophy and Theology

These philosophy and theology notes focus on the ethics o f rem oving arti
ficially adm inistered nutrition and hydration (ANH) from patients in perm anent
com a, post-com a unresponsiveness, or (as it is m ore com m only but som ew hat
pejoratively called) persistent vegetative state (PVS). A lthough the case o f Terri
Schindler Schiavo brought this situation to national attention, these reflections do
not deal w ith the specific details o f h er m oral, legal, and fam ilial situation. Rather,
they focus on five issues raised by responses to the M arch 20, 2004, address o f
Pope John Paul II to participants at the conference in Rom e on Life-Sustaining
Treatm ents and Vegetative State:
• W hat is the exact authority o f this papal teaching?
• D oes the allocution require A N H in all cases for PVS patients, in virtually
all cases, as a general ideal that m ay be often unrealized, or in some other
sense?
• D oes this papal allocution represent a rejection or overturning o f the long
standing C atholic tradition o f distinguishing ordinary and extraordinary
m eans?
• Is hum an life valuable, w orth preserving, even i f no higher function is pos
sible?
• D oes this allocution, despite its obvious m otivation to forw ard a “culture o f
life,” in fact underm ine such a culture?
W hile I cannot in the space allotted arrive at definitive conclusions about these
m atters, n or even a com prehensive review o f the literature, I hope to provide an
overview o f the m ajor issues that have arisen from this address so that readers can
get some sense o f the current debate.
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The A uthority o f P ope John P aul IPs Allocution
In “A B urden o f M eans: Interpreting R ecent Catholic M agisterial Teaching
on End-of-Life Issues” (Journal o f the Society o f Christian Ethics, 2006), Jam es
Bretzke, S.J., begins his discussion o fth e P ope’s allocution w ith some useful guide
lines for exegesis and interpretation o f m agisterial texts, noting that the character,
the frequency, and the m anner o f the teaching are all relevant in determ ining the
proper interpretation o f a m agisterial teaching. A lthough helpful in m any ways,
B retzke’s em phasis tends to be som ew hat reductionary in its account o f the obedi
ence due the papal m agisterium . Bretzke correctly indicates that this allocution did
not claim infallibility, and that any teaching that is not infallible is therefore fallible.
By definition, there is no m iddle ground. Yet the issue o f infallibility does not settle
the position that should be taken tow ard this papal teaching. In L um en gentium , the
Second Vatican C ouncil notes that
religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the
authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex
cathedra; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is
acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered
to, according to his manifest mind and will. (n. 25, emphasis added)
In discussing the papal allocution, B retzke— like K evin O ’R ourke in “R e
flections on the Papal A llocution Concerning Care for Persistent Vegetative State
Patients” (Christian Bioethics, April 2006)— m entions in passing various “reversals”
o f Church teaching, but w hether there have been reversals in teaching rem ains very
m uch a m atter in dispute. Lending m oney at interest and the question o f religious
liberty are exam ples o f the C hurch’s apparent reversals.1 Even though the allocu
tion was not an exercise o f extraordinary papal infallibility, however, it is properly
described as an act o f the papal m agisterium .
Is A N H R equired fo r P V S Patients?
Taking the m inority perspective, Bretzke believes that the Pope did not in
fact affirm th at it is m andatory to provide hydration and nutrition (even by artifi
cial m eans) to patients in a persistent vegetative state. Bretzke writes, “Only w hen
both the fin is operis and the fin is operantis are taken together in a set o f concrete
circum stances can the m oral m eaning o f the action be adequately evaluated.”
M uch hinges on w hat is m eant by “adequately evaluated.” I f this phrase m eans
th at one cannot com e to a com plete evaluation o f the situation m orally unless all
circum stances are considered, then it is unproblem atic. I f som eone perform s an
intrinsically evil act, one cannot com pletely evaluate the situation w ithout know l
edge o f the concrete circum stances and intention— including the agent’s culpabil

1For those who deny such changes, see, for example, Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J.,
“Religious Freedom: Innovation and Development,” First Things 118 (December 2001):
35-39; Brian Mullady, O.P., “Religious Liberty: Homogeneous or Heterogeneous Develop
ment?” Thomist 58 (1994): 93-108; and, on usury, John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political,
and Legal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 205-217.
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ity and the degree o f departure from the rule o f charity— as w ell as the nature o f
the act itself. B ut one can, sim ply from know ing the fin is operis, have adequate
know ledge o f w hether that fin is operis is m orally perm issible, w ithout know ledge
o f the further intentions (in the sense o f m otivations) and circum stances surround
ing perform ance o f the act. A t least that is the teaching o f John Paul II in Veritatis
splendor: “Consequently, w ithout in the least denying the influence on m orality
exercised by circum stances and especially by intentions, the C hurch teaches that
‘there exist acts w hich per se and in them selves, independently o f circum stances,
are alw ays seriously w rong by reason o f their object’” (n. 80).
Applying this principle to the case at hand is m ore com plicated, however, since
rem oval o f A N H is not per se evil (as is adultery or perjury) unless it is perform ed
with the intention o f killing as an act o f euthanasia by omission. M ost agree that AN H
can be rem oved licitly in cases w hen a person can no longer assim ilate nutrients, or
in cases w hen death is im m inent and nutrition and hydration no longer benefit the
patient. Bretzke views the removal o f Schiavo’s tube as such a case. “Terri Schiavo’s
feeding tube could be m orally rem oved [because] its rem oval was not intended to
cause her death, but rather that the fin is operis/operantis o f the w ithdraw al o f the
A N H w as the intended rem oval o f the last artificial obstacle to the com pletion o f
the dying process.” In the A pril 2006 issue o f Christian Bioethics, John C. H arvey
m akes a sim ilar claim (“The B urdens-Benefits R atio Consideration for M edical
A dm inistration o f N utrition and H ydration to Persons in the Persistent Vegetative
State”) and asserts that such individuals in a PVS have a “fatal pathology” because
“they die o f starvation and dehydration i f m edical intervention is not m ade.” Peter
Clark m akes a sim ilar point in the same issue (“Tube Feedings and Persistent Veg
etative State Patients: O rdinary or Extraordinary M eans?”).
This analysis does not seem to com port w ith the facts o f the case. Schiavo was
not in the process o f dying, at least as com m only understood. A s far as I am aware,
i f A N H had been continued, she could have survived years longer. H er death was
in no sense im m inent until A N H was rem oved, nor was it directly caused by the
injuries she sustained years earlier; rather, she died from dehydration caused by the
rem oval o f ANH . To call PVS from anoxia a fatal pathology because one w ill die
w ithout A N H is like calling diabetes a fatal pathology because one w ill die w ithout
insulin. It is true that death follow s w ithout intervention, but a fatal pathology is, it
w ould seem by definition, not som ething that one can live w ith for years— in some
cases o f PVS, up to thirty-five years.2
In an article defending the allocution, W illiam E. M ay described the experi
ence learned from those who care for PVS patients:
We learned that individuals in this condition are not suffering from a fatal pathol
ogy, that they are in a relatively stable condition and are capable of living for some
time so long as they receive food and hydration. We learned that at the beginning
they are capable of swallowing, but that feeding them orally takes a great deal of

2
Robert D. Orr and Gilbert Meilander, “Ethics & Life’s Ending: An Exchange,” First
Things 145 (August/September 2004): 31-38.
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time and that using tubes to feed them lightens the burdens of their caregivers. We
also learned that the cost of feeding them is very reasonable, and that they do not
have to be kept in expensive institutions but can be cared for at home if someone
is there to provide care and who can be helped by visiting nurses, etc.3
Indeed, ifth e m edical facts are as M ay describes, one could logically say that healthy
new borns suffer from a fatal pathology, since they can survive only i f provided with
nourishm ent.
In his reading o fth e papal statem ent (to allow for the removal o f ANH), Harvey
interprets the allocution’s phrase “proper finality” as the restoration o f full function,
w hich is im possible for PVS patients whose condition was caused by anoxia (though
not for PVS patients w hose conditions w ere caused by drug overdose). Thus, A N H
w ould be required for PVS patients who could recover full function, but not for
those who could not. In cases o f perm anent PVS, rem oval is w arranted because the
proper finality o f the m edical treatm ent, the cure o f the PVS, is im possible, so all
treatm ents aim ed at this goal are futile.
A difficulty w ith this reading o f the allocution is that John Paul II expressly
denies th at A N H is a “m edical treatm ent,” but rather asserts that it constitutes
ordinary care. A nother difficulty is that the allocution sim ply does not distinguish
betw een these tw o conditions (perm anent PVS caused by anoxia and potentially
reversible PVS caused by drug overdose); thus, m aking this distinction to interpret
the teaching could arguably be view ed m ore as eisegesis than exegesis.
M ost interpreters have read the allocution as requiring A N H for all PVS p a 
tients so long as the A N H is achieving the goal o f sustaining hum an life— its proper
finality. They have faulted or praised the speech on this basis.4
P a p a l A llocution and Catholic Tradition
A m ong those w ho fault the allocution as too restrictive, some see a contradic
tion betw een the allocution and the Catholic tradition o f judgm ent w ith respect to
w hich m eans o f preserving life are obligatory and w hich are not required. M ost o f
these authors draw on the 1958 G regorian doctoral dissertation o f Daniel A. Cronin,
The M o ra l Law in R egard to the Ordinary a n d Extraordinary M eans o f Conserving
Life. (See, for exam ple, the articles by H arvey and O ’Rourke, as w ell as those by
Jam es Drane and Thom as Shannon, in the A pril 2006 Christian Bioethics.) Citing
such venerable authorities as Francisco de V itoria (d. 1546), Dom ingo de Soto (d.
1560), G regory Sayrus (d. 1602), D om ingo Banez (d. 1604), and Jean-Pierre Gury
(d. 1866), supporters o f A N H w ithdraw al argue that the papal allocution contradicts

3William E. May, “Caring for Persons in the ‘Persistent Vegetative State’ and John
Paul II’s March 20, 2004 Address,” Medicina e Morale: Rivista internazionale di Bioetica
55 (May/June 2005): 535-555.
4Arguing for a more permissive interpretation of the allocution and for the point
that discontinuing care requires special justification, see Jorge L. A. Garcia, “A Catholic
Perspective on the Ethics of Artificially Providing Food and Water,” Linacre Quarterly 73.2
(May 2006): 132-152.
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these earlier understandings o f w hat constitutes extraordinary (and thus nonobliga
tory) m eans o f preserving life.
The role o f tradition rem ains an im portant one for Catholic ethics, yet the uses
o fth a t tradition are not always consistent. The tradition— especially the m ore recent
tradition— is hardly uniform on the proper uses o f ANH. A s L isa Sowle Cahill notes,
“O ver the past several years, different theologians, bishops and bishops’ conferences
have offered differing view s about w hether and w hen artificial nutrition should be
considered an extraordinary or disproportionate m eans.” 5 Indeed, none o f the scho
lastic authors cited had to deal w ith the issue o f providing A N H for PVS patients,
so w hat they w ould say about this m atter is conjecture based on their teachings at
the tim e. In m y view, there is indeed some tension betw een the allocution and the
teaching o f the scholastic authorities.
It is curious, however, that so m any contem porary authors come to the defense
o f the scholastic tradition against the papacy, when m ost i f not all o f these venerable
authorities w ould endorse Thomas A quinas’s teaching on the relationship between the
theologians and the magisterium: “We ought to abide by the authority o f the Church
rather than by that o f an Augustine or a Jerome or o f any doctor w hatever” (Summa
theologiae II-II, Q 10.12). Likewise, m any contem porary theologians endorse chang
ing Church teaching on contraception, despite a more historical, widespread, and
explicit condem nation o f the practice in the Rom an Catholic tradition.6 Moreover,
contem porary theologians have not criticized other (apparent) papal departures from
the tradition, such as Pope John Paul II’s teaching on capital punishm ent.7These uses
o f tradition in contem porary theology do not seem entirely consistent.
H um an Life as Intrinsic G ood
M any critics o f the papal allocution accuse the Pope o f “vitalism ,” a virtual
idolatry o f hum an life. Like O ’Rourke, they hold that to continue life in such a con
dition as a PVS does not constitute a great benefit; indeed, it does not constitute a
benefit at all. For example, Sowle Cahill writes, “Leaving the tubes in place cannot
be sim plistically equated with acting in [the patient’s] interests, since it could reason
ably be argued that fifteen or m ore years o f existence in a ‘vegetative’ state neither
serves hum an dignity nor presents a fate that m ost reasonable people would obviously
prefer to death.” 8

5Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Catholicism, Death and Modern Medicine,” America 192.14
(April 25, 2005): 14-17.
6The most definitive record of the condemnation, spread over many centuries, places,
and theological approaches, remains John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History o f Its
Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1965).
7I do not view Pope John Paul II’s teaching as inconsistent with tradition, although
I think it is a development. See Christopher Kaczor, “Capital Punishment and the Catholic
Tradition: Contradiction, Circumstantial Application, or Development of Doctrine?” Nova
et Vetera, English Edition 2.2 (Fall 2004): 279-304.
8Sowle Cahill, “Catholicism, Death and Modern Medicine,” 17.
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All defenders of the allocution, as far as I can tell, hold that life always con
stitutes a benefit for the person. Criticizing Sowle Cahill, Jorge Garcia writes,
I think it incoherent to deny that life is always a benefit to a human being and
can discern no disservice to human dignity in preserving a human life, in which
dignity inheres as such and irrespective of the blocking of many normal capacities.
On the contrary, to deem such a life as beneath preservation is to deny its inher
ent status. Whether many reasonable people would prefer death to a long life in
PVS is morally irrelevant, since they may seek escape in death out of despair and
incomprehension before the prospect of such a limited existence. Even reasonable
people, of course, form some preferences from irrational parts of the self.9

The obvious importance of the question of whether human life is always valuable,
as well as its anthropological implications for one’s conception of the human person,
is beyond the scope of these brief reflections. However, any anthropology that even
implicitly drives a dualistic wedge between the “biological” (or “vegetative”) life
and the “human” (or “personal”) life of the human being risks a dualism incompat
ible with a sound understanding of the human person. A frank discussion of this
matter among philosophers and theologians in the Catholic tradition may clarify
not only disputes about the papal allocution and the Schiavo case, but fundamental
approaches to some of the most important questions of our time.
The A llocution a n d the Culture o f Life

Finally, despite the Pope’s obvious intentions to the contrary, some writers,
like Clark, criticize the papal allocution for undermining a culture of life, driving
greater numbers of people toward direct euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
as a backlash to guidelines that are too restrictive.10 I think it more likely that per
mitting the removal of ANH from PVS patients in order to kill them will hasten
the call for more expeditious forms of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
After all, it seems more compassionate—toward the patient and those who watch
the end of the patient’s life—to quickly and easily dispatch a PVS patient with an
injection rather than watch the slow deterioration from dehydration over the course
of five to thirteen days.
Christopher K aczor, Ph .D.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

9Garcia, “Catholic Perspective,” 151.
10See also Sowle Cahill, “Catholicism, Death and Modern Medicine,” 17.
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